Speakers conference Moral Emotions
Mariëtte Willemsen
Mariëtte Willemsen studied Linguistics and Philosophy in Amsterdam and Tübingen. She wrote her Ph.D. on the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. She is assistant professor at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam where she teaches courses in Aesthetics and Modern Philosophy. Her current research project is on ‘Fiction and Emotion’.
Title: From Incomprehension to Disgust - Emotions and the Violation of Categories
Abstract: In Hiding from Humanity (Princeton University Press 2004) Martha Nussbaum scrutinises shame and disgust and the role these emotions play in the (American) Law. She argues that shame and disgust, other than for example fear and anger, are no reliable guides to public practice. Especially disgust she considers to be a ‘normatively distorted’ emotion that should not have the influence on (American) Law it often has.
In her analysis of disgust Nussbaum points to the fact that objects of disgust remind us of our mortality and animality. As can be seen from the (psychological) studies Nussbaum refers to ‘disgust pertains to our problematic relationship with our own animality’ (Hiding from Humanity, p. 89). What seems to be involved here is ‘boundary violation, violation of accepted categories’ (p. 93).
Nussbaum’s analysis of disgust can be taken as a starting point to examine a range of connected moral emotions: incomprehension, indignation, contempt and disgust. What underlies these emotions is a feeling of distance between the observer and the observed, a distance that may be caused by some sort of boundary violation. To see what the moral worth of these emotions can be and how they might influence our behaviour the following phenomena are looked at:
1) Negative reactions to TV programs like I want a famous face or Extreme makeover or The swan;
2) Bafflement or even horror towards products like ‘robocats’ (robotic cats that get angry or happy when stroked or hit);
3) The sense of alienation some people experience when they are told about virtual communities like Second Life or World of Warcrafts.
It may well be the case that people feel happier after an extreme makeover, that Alzheimer’s patients and children with ADHD feel better with a robocat around and that being someone else in Second Life is a great and lucrative experience, still one may want to reject these programs, objects and games because certain boundaries are not being respected. What sorts of boundary violations are going on here? What exactly are the emotions involved in these cases? How can these phenomena be related to the examples of utter disgust given by Nussbaum? And, finally, whatever emotions are at stake here, what is their moral relevance?
